The EU's verification laws will ensure much more of these leaks in the future, and therefore much more fines

Show me the consequences. I hear there are supposed to be repercussions, but these asshats never seem to pay for their crimes.

Why can't verification simply be go to post office, clerk will affadavit that you presented correct ID via online form. Which could also do the photo lookup for good measure.

Store that fact in the computer. Good for one ID usage. Good for less critical stuff like this weed thing (versus say a visa application which may need to store).

The analogy is a nightclub bouncer checks your ID.

For liveness i suppose you need a good graphics card.

So dystopian

Not even needed many times, I was recently at an overseas airport that wanted you to scan your passport to log into the internet. Ya not happening. On another device I downloaded a "sample" passport image of a British passport, the first one on Google images, pointed the phone at the device screen. "This will never work" , he thought as he was immediately logged in. All this stuff really hurts the people who follow the rules the most.

10 years after I took the ACT, I received a letter from a university that I never went to, saying my SSN was leaked.

WHY THE F**k ARE THEY HOLDING ON TO THAT 10 YEARS LATER!?!?!?

Of course now I know better than to give out my SSN to anyone who asks for it, but I didn't know that as a teenager.

Until stupid s**t like this becomes illegal, it will just keep continuing.

  > Once a document has been used to verify a person's identity and that the person is of legal age, there is no reason to retain a copy of the document any more.

Might KYC laws and general CYA policies prefer to keep the proof of age? For instance to protect e.g. against a minor altering the date on their passport. Especially in such a regulated industry.

Why wouldn't they? There are probbaly significant downsides if they fail an audit requirement, and they're probably mandated to retain records for some period, with no consequences to extended retention.

Set up a system so that it costs you nothing to do a bad thing but possibly wrecks you legally and financially to do the good thing, and people will inevitably do the bad thing. They shouldn't be collecting this information in the first place.

The people who design these policies are incapable of actually building things that work. They are not the intelligent, competent leaders exercising a careful craft that they like to pretend they are.

They keep going after age verification, online ID, central bank digital currencies, etc - keep this incident in mind. The people who implement and write these policies are morons. They don't game things out and plan for redundancy or resiliency. They don't take into account bad faith actors. They don't account for deliberate exploitation of the system.

I have a story about this, although it's a bit convoluted and not entirely related. But it does showcase low-value usecase compromising a high-value auth mechanism.

I was working on a project, client is a Real Estate agency, they use a CRM where they upload houses and it in turn uploads it to various sites like Zillow. We needed a list of their listed houses, so we wanted to use that data source instead of making a CRUD where they have to add houses yet again.

We ask the CRM sales team about APIs, they tell us that there's no accounts for third parties, client accounts have APIs, so we have to ask the client for an API key (or for their account password).

Which makes sense in general I guess, but the data is public in our case, so the CRM sales staff 's idea was that we should ask the client to let us access their account in order to get public data. We proceeded to scrape the houses from a website like Zillow like cavemen.

As it happens, our project was ancilliary low-value. So I don't doubt that the clients of this CRM are vulnerable in a similar way, and the root cause of the issue isn't evident at all, I can see 2:

1- Paradoxically, having an API that always requires an API KEY (as opposed to allowing unauthenticated access for public data) is less secure, as credentials/tokens will be used more often when not necessary.

2- This CRM effectively acted as an aggregator, consuming the APIs to publish to other vendors, but they don't provide an API for other vendors to read data from them. This effectively causes third party vendors to authenticate as the client, which is just incorrect. Credentials should identify a person/group, not a usecase.

I'm not sure how it works in the EU, but in the US, most states have a "PMP" (prescription monitoring program) that tracks the sale of marijuana in many states (nevermind that its not an actual prescription, but it is a controlled substance) and viewable by your doctor back up to ~12 months or so. Most people don't know this however and think it works like alcohol sales where it's sold after ID verification and then everyone forgets about it. Some states treat marijuana sales like prescription drug dispensing, it has to be reported to a central database including the intimate details of the persons involved. I have no idea if this is the case in Spain, however.

In a word: complaints.

It’s somewhat understandable but also part of the problem.

> Why do these systems hold onto user's data post verification?

Depending on the company, you could rate the reasons on a scale from "incompetence/naivete" to "revenue stream".

There are various reasons. What if it turned out someone was using a stolen ID or a fake ID, or the ID didn't match the face, or it wasn't even an ID? You'd want to be able to see how your process missed it.

The real problem is that there aren't many options for real authentication over getting people to upload pictures of high-value credentials. Now every service has to be a security expert, like encrypting the images at rest so they aren't the ones who leak it.

It's kind of like how dumb our credit card system is where you have to both share a secret with everyone (from random websites to random restaurants) while hoping the bad guys never get it because the secret can be used anywhere. It kinda works against everyone except the bad guys.

Maybe it's time we come up with a deliberate system.

The leak came from a third party ID/age verification service for a regulated substance in a heavily regulated region. I think there's a good chance that they're under various regulatory/KYC type laws that would make holding onto user data mandatory. One practical scenario where this would come into play is if they were suspected of intentionally accepting fraudulent credentials, basically acting like a fake ID service for hire. In that case authorities would want to be able to see all data that they were basing acceptance on.

the whole "not being an automatable remote sql injection away from everything" quality of physical objects grants a filing cabinet a tremendous amount of inherent security compared to anything digital.

Stealing a shoebox of photocopied passports from every hotel in the city sounds like way more work and way riskier than downloading an already aggregated trove of digital data.

My guess is that the machine readable chip standards and the production quality required to replicate a physical passport are high enough that only the most organized of organized crime can fake the highest value passports effectively, and if a passport is easy to replicate, it is less likely to have visa free access to most countries.

To second the photographed/photocopied requirements, as an expat, I am frequently asked to send a scan of my passport to people or entities that are not necessarily the most secure.

I also have a couple of important documents that are literally PDFs. My Canadian citizenship certificate is a PDF with a barcode in it, that I can print off a copy of if I need to mail it, or show on my phone to a consular office or a border guard if needed. My work visa here in New Zealand is a PDF with my passport number and a visa number, which my workplace and bank checked with an online database. Fundamentally, these and my passport are pointers to a row in various databases.

I am working on hotel software. And we are doing an automated kiosk check in with identity scanning. I’m seriously stressed about holding on to this kind of toxic waste. I am trying to limit it as much as possible. For example throwing away scans as fast as possible (within regulatory allowances). But I would love to hear any ideas anyone has in terms of further security. Obviously the documents are not just on a public bucket. But I’m considering maybe encrypting each document with a separate key, or something along those lines.

At smaller hotels or hostels I've had the staff take photos of ID with their own personal devices.

I had my identity stolen this way before.

Since then, I do not allow the scans anymore. It is a dreadful feeling showing up to a hotel not knowing if you'll get turned away at the last minute because you take a stand for your privacy. So far, none have been willing to lose the bookings, but I know sooner or later my luck will run out and I'll have to find last minute accomodations.

> people who travel have had their passport scanned, photographed or photocopied by pretty much every hotel they've stayed in.

This. I hate it. People expect you to send your documents on messaging apps and god only knows where they end up. Unfortunately, I fear there's nothing we can do to stop this as govs enforce this kind of operations.

It's far worse than that. In a lot of cases when you pay on booking.com, they don't charge your card. Instead, they send all your information (including CVV) along to the hotel where they can charge you how they want. A hotel I visited in Austria, had my card details printed out on a piece of A4 paper.

Identity theft is a term made up by banks and institutions who don't want to take responsibility for who they sign contracts with. Despite billions of profits they have every year.

Yep. Teenagers are famously incapable of finding a dealer who might even be their mate.

After all of that why protect the company by not mentioning their name?

> The family member got the sack.

Isn't this classic wrongful termination?

I'm sorry, how many figures?

I admire the naive optimism of someone who'd expect otherwise but why would you? If you want to pursue such a thing, get a lawyer because you're now legal enemies with the school leadership and this should be obvious the moment you start thinking getting yourself involved in such an affair.

i could swear i have read that same story here before but can't find it

Could we update the link to the original article? https://cambridgeanalytica.org/data-breaches-scandals/passpo...

Is this the CA from FB fame? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Analytica? If so how come they still exist?

I think the URL should be changed to The Verge link or something else as the current source is repetitive AI writing and incohesive to read.

Looks like this only works on smartphones? Well... no thanks.

Ironic, using the domain of the British Indian Ocean Territory instead of a .eu domain

While visiting Italy I've had the hotel photocopy my ID. I've researched and the legal requirement for the hotel is to fill a form on the police website, nothing more. While doing the checkout I've pressed them on the reason for keeping the photocopy ("is it for identity theft? "), the duration they were going to keep the copy etc. Basic info they were bound to disclose because of GDPR _before_ the data processing, which of course never happened.

Turns out the local policemen asked verbally to make photocopies, just in case... The hotel is more afraid of the local police than of it's clients, so they just do it.

Since I was the only client who ever asked about it, and gaslighting me wasn't going to work ("everybody does it! what do you have to hide?"), they just gave me the copy to destroy.

Other places copy IDs because they're lazy and don't want to compile the required form on the spot. Not to mention ID photocopies floating around the reception desk in plain sight...

To be able to push back you should know the law requirements for hotels in that jurisdiction, so they can't gaslighting you with fake "it's for police" reasons.

If these kinds of breaches were actually costly, then people would indeed treat PII as toxic. But they aren't. The media brouhaha blows over within a week or so, and things are fine again.

Leaking PII should be very, very expensive, and then this idiocy would stop.

It is quite interesting how this is handled world wide. For me PII is very sensitive and I advice people to be very cautious. Every business in the EU (were I live) also has to be very careful with such data by law. Fines are now at a level were they can hurt the business significantly.

During vacation in an Asian country on the other side all of this was basically a no brainer for smaller to medium businesses. I once rented a scooter there and the business owner had all her documents organised in WhatsApp chats. Including now my passport plus drivers licence... The people in general in that country were also very relaxed when it came to giving out their contact details to random businesses.

I don't want to throw shade on them, thus no country name. Incredible friendly and welcoming people there.

Why would they treat it as toxic?

They don't have a moral code, and they don't pay any price for mistakes.

They have zero incentive.

Processing such PII here with an external AI partner:

- last week, we had bug: I said: "couldnt you just re-run the same step with the same data again" - their answer: "we cant! look at paragraph XY in our GDPR agreement, we are deleting all input documents everything after it has been processed"

Very well implemented! :)

(though, I had to upload and re-initiate eveything again)

And they will continue to ask for data, that they don't actually need like phone numbers and home addresses.

Different countries handle these things differently, but it's honestly surprising to me that a photo of a passport or drivers license have any value. It provides no security, so why would anyone ever accept it a proof of identity?

> We should stop treating digital pictures of physical documents as some sort of credentials.

This is how biometric "authentication" works - you slide a picture (of a face, or maybe a fingerprint or hand geometry) under a door, and the guard on the other side of the door looks at the picture, maybe compares it to some database somewhere and then says PASS/FAIL. Maybe the device taking the picture has some sort of cryptography to prevent yourself from shoving a picture of some authorized person. Usually not.

People keep trying to find the correct magic spell to make biometrics "foolproof". That's a waste of time. Blackhat/DEFCON type conferences were showing people how to make fingerprints out of (the gelatin that makes) gummy bears back in the late 90s. Make them thin enough and you can fool pulse detection (carjackers in some Asian countries were chopping fingers off to bypass theft deterrent systems that used fingerprints).

It is not an option in every country to do what you do. Thinking of it, its probably a quirk if Germany that you can go to a Post Office to be “verified”.